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Abstract
Background: The advent of global health initiatives (GHIs) has changed the landscape and architecture of health
financing in low and middle income countries, particularly in Africa. Over the last decade, the African Region has
realised improvements in health outcomes as a result of interventions implemented by both governments and
development partners. However, alignment and harmonisation of partnerships and GHIs are still difficult in the
African countries with inadequate capacity for their effective coordination.
Method: Both published and grey literature was reviewed to understand the governance, priorities, harmonisation
and alignment of GHIs in the African Region; to synthesise the knowledge and highlight the persistent challenges;
and to identify gaps for future research.
Results: GHI governance structures are often separate from those of the countries in which they operate. Their
divergent funding channels and modalities may have contributed to the failure of governments to track their
resources. There is also evidence that basically, earmarking and donor conditions drive funding allocations regardless of
countries’ priorities. Although studies cite the lack of harmonisation of GHI priorities with national strategies, evidence
shows improvements in that area over time. GHIs have used several strategies and mechanisms to involve the private
sector. These have widened the pool of health service policy-makers and providers to include groups such as civil
society organisations (CSOs), with both positive and negative implications. GHI strategies such as co-financing by
countries as a condition for support have been positive in achieving sustainability of interventions.
Conclusions: GHI approaches have not changed substantially over the years but there has been evolution in terms of
donor funding and conditions. GHIs still largely operate in a vertical manner, bypassing country systems; they compete
for the limited human resources; they influence country policies; and they are not always harmonised with other
donors. To maximise returns on GHI support, there is need to ensure that their approaches are more comprehensive as
opposed to being selective; to improve GHI country level governance and alignment with countries’ changing
epidemiologic profiles; and to strengthen their involvement of CSOs.
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Background
The advent of global health initiatives (GHIs) has chan-
ged the landscape and architecture of health financing in
low and middle income countries, particularly in Africa
[1]. GHIs arose as a funding mechanism out of the need
to advocate, mobilise and hasten funding, for some key
health problems facing the globe [2]. More than 100
GHIs have been created over the last 20 years with the
aim of assisting countries to achieve their health out-
comes [2]. GHIs have mainly targeted disease conditions
that affect poor countries, saving many lives [2].
In the last decade the African Region has seen improve-
ments in health outcomes resulting from the substantial
efforts of both governments and development partners
[1, 3–6]. Besides multilateral and bilateral assistance,
which are important sources of funding for health devel-
opment, the African Region continues to register an
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increasing number of health partnerships and initiatives.
This has made the aid architecture complex [7, 8].
Although partnerships and health initiatives provide
an opportunity for health sector development, the var-
iety of their funding levels, instruments for engagement
with countries, focus, and scope of support creates chal-
lenges for the recipient countries [9–16]. The large num-
ber of health partnerships and initiatives also generates a
wide range of issues and concerns in ensuring that they
are aligned to sector priorities, and in preventing over-
burdening of government officials with extra demands
[17–23]. GHIs are renowned for their large funding to
countries. For example, three prominent GHIs, the World
Bank’s Multi-country HIV/AIDS Program (MAP), the
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
(GFATM) and the US President’s Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) have provided more than two-thirds
of all direct external funding for scaling up HIV/AIDS
prevention, treatment and care in resource-poor coun-
tries [15].
The term global health initiative has been a subject of
debate [24]. Nervi [25] claims that several initiatives that
have identified themselves as global are in fact bilateral
and involve only one recipient country. There are conten-
tions regarding GHI management approaches, particularly
in regard to the fact that though several GHIs have their
distinct governance structures, they require the services of
the same human resources that support the health sector
in the countries, which is viewed as burdensome [20, 26].
There have also been concerns about the nature of
support rendered by GHIs, particularly regarding its
focus, level, scheduling and timing, conditions and restric-
tions, all of which are thought to water down the positive
synergism of GHIs [13, 22].
Alignment and harmonisation of partnerships and glo-
bal health initiatives with national priorities are still
challenges for the African countries with inadequate
capacity for effective coordination of such undertakings
[20, 21, 27]. In their stewardship efforts to strengthen
health systems, governments are sometimes overwhelmed
by partnerships and initiatives that have parallel ap-
proaches, which cause fragmentation of resources and
hamper the holistic implementation of national health
strategic plans [13, 21, 22, 28]. Partnerships and their
members have peculiar priorities and ways of working
and, consequently, consensus is not always achieved at
the country level [28]. The partners’ unique reporting
frameworks, funding cycles, focus and scope make align-
ing interventions for health systems strengthening difficult
[15, 29, 30]. In addition, there are concerns that an in-
creasing number of initiatives focus on issues, themes
or diseases rather than on comprehensive approaches
to health development and health systems strengthening
[13, 22, 26, 31]. In this regard, there is a need to foster
coherence of partnerships and health initiatives in the
African Region in order to improve their complementarity
and alignment. In addition, it is important to streamline
partners’ efforts for harmonised action and greater mutual
accountability and, to minimise duplications [22]. With
Africa now embarking on the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs) and aiming for universal health coverage,
better understanding of GHI governance, priorities, har-
monisation, and alignment is crucial. This will help de-
velop strategies to improve GHI usefulness and impact on
health. This paper mainly aims to help familiarise African
governments with the peculiarities of the governance,
priorities, harmonisation and alignment of GHIs for better
implementation of their activities.
Methods
This was a rapid literature review. A formal definition or
methodology does not exist for a rapid literature review
[32], but authors such as Khangura et al. [33] believe
that it is becoming important as a tool to inform policy-
makers and decision-makers on specific topics. The term
“evidence summaries” is preferred to literature review.
Characteristically, a rapid review is a short overview of
available literature for a research question or set of re-
search questions related to a single topic. For this study,
the operational definition of GHIs was based on their
possession of the following characteristics:
 Addresses a major health issue of international
concern
 Is an organised effort linking people, partners and
organisations
 Targets several countries
 Focuses on specific diseases or selected
interventions, commodities or services
 Has the ability to generate resources for a country
 Is time limited
The main objectives of this review were to (1) explore
and understand GHI governance processes, priorities,
and harmonisation and alignment with country priorities
in the African Region, (2) summarise and document these
findings, and (3) identify gaps in the literature for future
research and systematic reviews. The first two objectives
were relevant for improved functioning of GHIs in Africa.
Two researchers conducted the rapid review. They first
agreed on the research question, including the typology,
and then on the databases to search and the search terms.
They searched all the relevant literature related to GHIs
and/or global health partnership (GHP) and low income
countries (LMICs). The databases used were PubMed,
Web of Knowledge, Web of Science, Google Scholar as
well as websites of English language publications. Both
peer-reviewed and grey literature was included in the
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search, with preference and emphasis given to literature
focusing on the implementation and operations of GHIs
in developing countries and Africa. Twenty three papers
were initially identified, thereafter the researchers made
use of their reference lists to obtain an additional 27
papers. All types of studies in Africa on the subject of
interest were included in the review. Both researchers
extracted the data from the literature and collated and
summarised them according to the themes of interest.
Results
GHI governance structures
GHIs use various aid modalities in the countries they
support and are generally criticised for their vertical gov-
ernance structures [29]. They have a tendency to create
their own country-level coordination groups or commit-
tees and programmes [34]. The four main GHIs, the GAVI
Alliance, GFTAM, MAP and PEPFAR, for example, all
have their distinct governance structures at the country
level. The GAVI Alliance has a secretariat and a board at
the global level but no staff in the countries. Decisions on
vaccines are usually made by the Inter-agency Coordin-
ation Committee formed specifically for GAVI Alliance. In
the case of the Global Fund, a secretariat and a board
oversee GFATM’s functioning while a country coordin-
ating mechanism and local fund agents operate at the
country level [35]. United States’ GHIs have global AIDS
coordinators and country teams coordinated through
United States embassies. MAP is coordinated by the
Global HIV/AIDS Programme and regional teams such
as the AIDS Campaign Team for Africa and the South
Asia Regional AIDS Team; the World Bank country
director and national governments.
The persistent use of separate structures by GHIs is
prompted by the weak state of the governance systems
in Africa and other developing countries [1], the need to
ensure effective use of funds, wider involvement of
stakeholders, and to affect performance and outcomes.
Evidence, however, shows that the separate and different
structures have several negative consequences [8, 13, 29],
including that (1) the countries are overburdened with the
parallel and duplicative processes from the many GHIs
[1]; (2) GHIs often bypass the existing donor coordination
processes in the countries such as the Sector-wide Ap-
proach (SWAp) and the general budget support (GBS)
mechanisms [29]; and (3) GHI operations generate the
risk of competition for the limited skilled workforce [29,
36]. It is clear that GHIs are preferred to governments as
employers owing to their lucrative enumeration and in-
centives [13, 36].
From the literature, GHIs are viewed as operating in a
top-down manner with many of their restrictions being
imposed from the global level. A vast majority of them
are governed by boards consisting of a variety of partners
with different backgrounds, aims and perspectives [25].
One of the main thrusts of GHIs is to foster involve-
ment of civil society organisations (CSOs) in their activ-
ities, and they have several modalities for this [15]. Two
common strategies are through CSO membership in
GHI national committees and as recipients of GHI funds.
Despite their good intentions, these approaches have been
viewed as challenging, owing to the difficulties in ensuring
CSO representativeness, capacity and accountability [13].
Funding modalities
Most GHI funding support is earmarked for specific areas,
with HIV being more commonly supported. Earmarked
support is off budget support with multiple reporting sys-
tems. GHIs are concerned about good governance, and in
their quest to ensure that funds are allocated and reach
the intended beneficiaries, they have created many frag-
mented channels [29]. For example, in Angola the re-
source flows for funds from GFTAM and the President’s
Malaria Initiative are completely distinct from those of the
Ministry of Finance [37]. This poses difficulties in tracking
resource flows, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
Examples from Burkina Faso and Mozambique illus-
trate how GHIs circumvent local financial systems in
favour of their discrete systems. In Burkina Faso, the
GAVI Alliance and GFTAM used a demand-driven ap-
proach to funding rather than the government’s SWAp
system, which integrates single reports for all donors
and provides decentralised funding to districts [38]. This
was also observed in Mozambique, where the GAVI Al-
liance and PEPFAR support was not handled through
the Ministry of Finance’s management process but by
representatives or officials designated by the Ministry
of Health [38]. However, there have been efforts by
GHIs to reduce transaction costs, for example by pro-
viding resources commensurate with the challenge of
absorbing aid, complementing existing country processes
or systems, and improving communication.
Areas of support
GHIs mainly focus on communicable diseases [13, 34, 39].
A study by the World Health Organization Maximizing
Positive Synergies Collaborative Group found out that
HIV/AIDS had disproportionately the greatest GHI sup-
port compared with other diseases [13]. In fact, 60 % of the
GHIs in that study targeted the big three diseases of HIV/
AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, with HIV/AIDS attracting
the most GHIs [34, 36]. It is reasonable to justify the con-
centration on HIV/AIDS, since it was responsible for high
levels of mortality and morbidity before the introduction of
antiretroviral drugs. By 2007, GFTAM, PEPFAR and MAP
were contributing more than two-thirds of all external
funding for HIV/AIDS and malaria in low resource
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countries [40]. This funding was committed to several
areas that target HIV and related conditions such as tu-
berculosis [4]. Table 1 summarises the main character-
istics and HIV/AIDS commitments of the three GHIs.
GHIs are also renowned for the part they play in
raising the profile of most neglected diseases such as
onchocerciasis, dengue, trachoma, tetanus and schisto-
somiasis. Evidence shows that GHIs have programmes
for these diseases, which in the past have had a low
political profile and prioritisation [41]. GHIs have three
broad strategies for supporting neglected diseases: raising
the profile of the diseases, improving the delivery of inter-
ventions, and donating drugs. But support for neglected
diseases in developing countries is viewed as unsustain-
able, and the consequences can be dire where support
programmes are terminated. For example, Uganda faced
major problems with drug shortages for neglected diseases
after the drug donation period ended [34].
GHIs do not address all the gaps in health provision.
For example, very few GHIs focus on non-communicable
diseases [13]. There have also been concerns that most
GHIs do not deal with certain areas that have a significant
contribution to disability-adjusted life year (DALYs) losses
such as maternal and reproductive health, depressive dis-
orders, alcohol dependence and road traffic accidents, or
the rising cancer incidences [13]. Some of the literature
Fig. 1 Fragmented financial flows for MOF, Global Fund and PMI in Angola. Source: Global Health Partnerships, Assessing Country Consequences, 2005
Table 1 Main characteristics and HIV/AIDS commitments of three GHIs, 2000–2004
World Bank Global Fund PEPFAR
GHI type Multilateral agency Public-private partnership Bilateral donor
Start 2000 (fiscal year 2001) 2002 2003 (fiscal year 2004)
Focus disease HIV/AIDS HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria HIV/AIDS
Priority Use of national AIDS strategic
plans for setting priorities
Flexible funding based on priorities
set by country stakeholders
Achieving programmatic targets
set by the US Congress
Management system National AIDS council (NAC)
and NAC secretariat
Global Fund secretariat country Office of the US Global AIDS
Coordinator (OGAC)
Funding allocation Based on government and NAC Performance-based funding Predetermined earmarked funding
Types of funded interventions Community responses and
capacity building
Proportion to intervention Proportionate to treatment and
prevention
Principle recipients Multisectoral, government
ministries, NAC, civil society
Government, NAC, civil society International NGOs
Disbursement funding
HIV/AIDS (millions of USD
2003 307.7 789.1 949.2
2006 36.1 1031.3 2517.6
Sources: OECD CRS database, Oomman et al. 2007
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argues that although technical support to countries is
crucial, GHI support has not been very successful [29].
Some reasons for this include the unclear and lack of a
structured approach to identifying the gaps, and coord-
inating demand and supply to the identified technical
assistance needs. Technical assistance has been ad-hoc
and driven by urgent and immediate needs at the coun-
try level, an approach that often is unsustainable [42].
According to Biesma et al. [18], there were also unmet
needs in the technical support provided by GHIs, such
as in linking planning and disease prevalence, training
on management and planning, cost-benefit analyses, mon-
itoring and evaluation, and across-country application of
lessons. GHIs have been blamed for selectively supporting
certain groups that are easy to reach, contributing to the
widening of the inequity gap [12, 29]. Much of the litera-
ture shows that GHIs are not completely aligned with the
countries’ national strategic plans and often impose pre-
conceived ideas [12, 29, 37].
Funding levels
Despite the structural adjustment programmes and the
worldwide recession, developing countries have seen a
rise in development assistance for health since the early
2000s [3]. From studies mapping GHIs and GHPs, it is
evident that Africa has the most GHPs per country
followed by Asia. Eastern and central Europe have the
lowest numbers of GHPs [28]. There are indications that
a correlation exists between the number of GHPs
operating in a country and its per capita GDP [34]. In gen-
eral, the lower the per capita GDP, the greater the number
of GHPs in the country, although there are inconsistencies
[34]. The development assistance for health per DALY for
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria has increased in
particular. Between 2002 and 2006, 32 % of the official
development assistance for health was for HIV/AIDS
and mostly went through the main GHIs for HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, malaria and childhood immunisation, in-
cluding polio. In 2007, investment through these GHIs
accounted for two-thirds of all external funding for HIV/
AIDS, 57 % for tuberculosis and 60 % for malaria [13].
Substantial differences exist in the countries that have
received GHI funding [43]. There is considerable variation
in development assistance for health per DALY across re-
gions and within regions as shown in Fig. 2. This variabil-
ity is highly influenced by income, burden of disease,
political stability, and historical and political relations be-
tween specific donors and recipient countries [43].
GHIs include NGOs and CSOs in their support.
Although the channelling of funds through NGOs by
GHIs has been riddled with controversy, a substantial
portion of GHI funding is earmarked for NGOs and
CSOs [44]. For example, GFTAM had allocated 30 % of
all its grants to civil society groups in the countries of
its support [44]. GHIs contribute directly to raising the
overall health budgets of countries through their fund-
ing, but in a few cases they have done so through other
processes [18]. For example, in Benin GFTAM
Fig 2 Map showing cumulative 2002–07 development assistance for health (DAH) per all-cause disability-adjusted life-year (DALY). Source:
Ravishankar N. et al. Financing for global health: tracking developmental assistance for health from 1990 to 2007: Lancet 2009; 373: 2113-24
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contributions raised the overall budget for health
spending by about 15 % [18].
The conditions relating to funding disbursement and
performance have put immeasurable pressure on some
weak economies [22, 29, 45]. In some cases the countries
have failed to withdraw the funds allocated to them by
GHIs owing to the strictness of the associated conditions,
such as the requirement for performance-based reporting
and to follow strict quality assurance guidelines [46].
Tanzania is a good example of a country where the condi-
tions imposed by the GFTAM and MAP posed challenges
in accessing their funds [46].
At the implementation level, delays in disbursement of
funds and bureaucratic processes affect the use and ab-
sorptive capacity of funds, sometimes necessitating their
return to the GHIs [46]. There are concerns also that in
future GHI support might have adverse implications on
sustainability and macroeconomic stability at the coun-
try level owing to the selective nature funding [47, 48].
This is in reference to activities or programmes initiated
by GHIs that the countries are eventually forced to sustain,
which might distort their funding architecture. Recently,
however, some GHIs have introduced co-financing as a
means to influence governments to contribute to activities,
in a way ensuring some form of sustainability [31]. For
example, the GAVI Alliance requires that the countries
contribute to the procurement of some of their required
vaccine doses. This policy encourages them to plan for fi-
nancially sustainable immunisation programmes once
GAVI Alliance support for new vaccines is phased out [31].
Alignment of GHIs with national strategic plans and
priorities
There has been growing concern in various African coun-
tries over the alignment of GHI objectives with those of
the national strategic plans [2, 17, 19, 21]. One school
of thought is that by nature, GHIs with their specific
earmarked funding, inevitably will influence the coun-
tries that are highly donor dependent. GHIs’ disease
focus has resulted in their shift from general health sys-
tems support [14, 21, 37, 49].
Examples exist on how GHIs have imposed restrictions
on countries, such as the rejection of Ugandan’s 2002
Round One crosscutting, systems-strengthening proposal
by GFTAM in favour of a more disease-specific proposal
[16]. Also, the requirement by GFTAM for Tanzania to
drop its proposal for a programme for orphans and
children and instead undertake one on an antiretroviral
treatment programme [46]. The failure to contain the spread
of the recent Ebola outbreak in West Africa has been associ-
ated with the global health governance mechanisms im-
plemented through GHIs that have predetermined
focuses to the detriment of health promotion and health
systems strengthening in countries [7]. The tide is
changing, however. Lesotho’s approach to the implemen-
tation of the new strategy for HIV prevention through vol-
untary medical male circumcision stands out as a good
example of how countries can challenge the traditional
structures of global health politics controlled by experts
and funders from high income countries [50]. To make an
informed, local decision, Lesotho’s policy-makers con-
sulted national statistics to determine if male circumci-
sion was an effective approach to addressing the spread
of HIV [50].
PEPFAR has been criticised for failing to link its objec-
tives with those of the national strategic plans of the
countries it supports [36, 40]. There is also evidence that
it is global earmarks and donor conditionality that drive
funding allocations regardless of countries’ diseases, health
needs or priorities [1, 40]. A study conducted across
Mozambique, Uganda and Zambia found that PEPFAR
provided consistent and same level of funding allocations
in the three countries regardless of their epidemio-
logical and health systems’ differences [18]. According
to Mckinsey and Company, BMGF 2005 [37], the coun-
tries with strong integrated health plans, established
funding mechanisms with donor participation, and clearly
defined roles of central and district governments interact
the best with GHIs. This was also seen in an evaluation of
MAP that attributed the failure of its approach to coun-
tries’ lack of national plans prioritising the components of
their HIV/AIDS programme [51].
The multisectoral approach to HIV/AIDS is recognised
for its success and cited as an example to follow for other
disease conditions. However, how that approach is imple-
mented has been the subject of extreme argument
among health departments that feel disempowered or
are bypassed by some of the GHIs such as MAP that
favour that approach [51]. The failure to understand that
the HIV response was multisectoral led many countries to
ignore World Bank efforts to alleviate HIV/AIDS [51].
GHIs such as GFTAM also are faced with challenges for
their insistence on planning processes that involve the
country coordinating mechanism, a mutisectoral, private–
public committee. There was lack of trust between gov-
ernment agencies and NGOs, and in some instances
governments did not want to recognise the coordinating
mechanism [18]. There were concerns that some of the
country coordinating mechanisms lacked the capacity
to function satisfactorily and were influenced by a few
powerful members. The use of these mechanisms and the
existence of several of them for HIV made it difficult to
achieve alignment [36]. The presence of separate planning
structures for the GHIs and the countries has led to dupli-
cation of effort [36]. Some GHIs have attempted to im-
prove the harmonisation of their approaches with the
country planning processes. This has been done through
several strategies, as outlined in Table 2.
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Donor harmonisation and coordination
For aid to be effective there needs to be harmonisation
of the processes between donors and other partners at
the country level [52]. Harmonisation of donor policies
and practices and their alignment with national policies
have occurred at various levels across the countries. The
negative effects of poor donor harmonisation were re-
ported in the early years of the GHIs [18]. Despite the
efforts of the countries to improve coordination and har-
monisation of all donors, partners and GHIs, in the real
sense GHIs are rarely part of these initiatives, as they
tend to operate through separate systems and cycles or
schedules [45]. This is further compounded by the lack
of in country presence and as such, not able to partici-
pate in country dialogues in a consistent manner. To
date little harmonisation has occurred of GFTAM pro-
cesses and pre-existing planning and funding mecha-
nisms such as SWAp and joint interagency committees
[26, 53]. Evidence shows that GFATM’s requirement of
separate reporting systems is associated with higher
transaction costs [17, 22]. PEPFAR’s conditions, lack of
transparency and unwillingness to involve other donors
in its planning processes are cited as hindrances to har-
monisation and collective donor action [18, 40].
The literature shows that over time improvements in
harmonisation have occurred, with studies from 2004 to
2005 from across the countries indicating that GHIs are
harmonising their approaches [49]. GFTAM’s agreement
of 2004 to allow its funds to be channelled through
Mozambique’s SWAp, the common fund, was seen as a
pioneering example of how disease-specific programmes
could learn and adapt [40]. A review of the Mozambican
approach highlighted the fact that pooling of funds and
participation in SWAp structures had given GFTAM a
unique perspective on the Mozambican health sector,
whilst enabling it to become a more harmonised and
highly influential development partner [40]. Another ex-
ample is the support of harmonisation in Nigeria and
Namibia by GFTAM [18]. MAP projects through the
World Bank have made several attempts to harmonise
efforts in the countries, for example in Malawi, where
they supported the country’s integrated service delivery
approaches for pooling of resources and the national
AIDS councils (NACs) [54]. Despite the improvement in
the collaboration between PEPFAR and national systems
in information sharing, there is still reluctance among
GHIs to use national systems such as those of the Minis-
try of Finance or the reporting systems. PEPFAR has
been reported as not being transparent with other GHIs
working in the areas it deals with [40].
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of GHIs still is not
merged with the national systems, which means that
multiple M&E reports are being prepared at the national
and district levels [11] with different requirements for
the various programmes [37]. All the GHIs conduct their
separate assessments, but often involve the same con-
strained health human resources available at the national
and sub-national levels.
The literature shows contrasting perceptions of GFATM’s
alignment with existing country M&E systems. In
Cambodia, Uganda and Cameroon the use of GFATM
project monitoring tools undermined national programmes
and the Three Ones principle that requires countries use a
single M&E system [14]. PEPFAR implementers collect
large amounts of data that they do not generally share with
government coordinating bodies or other donor agencies
[18]. The World Bank, in its case, overburdens govern-
ments with extensive and complex procedural and report-
ing requirements for its MAP projects instead of using one
strategic framework, one national authority and one M&E
system [40].
The increasing funding for some specific health prob-
lems such as HIV/AIDS has forced many countries to
make efforts for greater coordination of programmes
and services at the national level. Several countries in
Africa like Malawi, Zambia and Tanzania have benefited
from the push by GFATM to institute mechanisms for
coordination of actors at the national level. However, the
incentives to ensure the functioning of the coordination
efforts are weak and practice falls far short of the intent
of the policy, especially at the sub-national level [40].
Further, involving all the relevant stakeholders, particu-
larly NGOs, in coordination bodies is a challenge in many
countries. The McKinsey study (2005) reported in Biesma
et al. [18] found that Tanzania and the Democratic Repub-
lic of the Congo had at least four committees overseeing
HIV/AIDS control, with little communication or com-
monalities among them.
Some positive effects of GHIs on coordination and plan-
ning have been reported. In Malawi for example, after the
Table 2 Examples of GHI influence in planning and coordination in some African countries
Approaches Examples
Medium- to long-term plans In Angola GHIs support helped in the identification of appropriate measures for controlling the
HIV/AIDS epidemic and for developing medium- to long-term plans.
Integration to national strategic objectives In Rwanda GHI-supported activities have been integrated into the national strategic objectives,
contributing to long-term sustainable interventions such as community health insurance schemes.
Influence on national and sub-national
planning
GHIs have had positive effects on national and sub-national planning processes for HIV/AIDS in
Zambia and Mozambique.
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study of the policy project by the United States Agency for
International Development in 2004 raised concern about
the multiplicity of HIV/AIDS coordinating structures, the
Malawi Partnership Forum was created in 2005 as the
central coordination structure for development partners,
overriding all other mechanisms [54].
GHI contribution to stakeholder involvement
By actively involving NGOs and CSOs in their programmes,
GHIs have changed the mind-set and perception that health
delivery is the responsibility of governments [55]. Almost all
GHIs tend to involve the private sector in their work, using
several strategies and mechanisms. PEPFAR, for example,
avoids the public sector in channelling its funds, choosing to
use mainly international NGOs that fund CSOs [40, 56].
The Stop TB Partnership emphasises inclusive governance
that incorporates the private sector, while GFATM’s country
coordinating mechanisms have private sector representation
on their committees. GHIs have been more effective than
other financing mechanisms in diversifying stakeholder
participation and involving NGOs and faith based orga-
nisations, enabling them to gain direct access to financial
resources [45, 57]. Studies conducted in Malawi, Benin
and Zambia showed that opportunities provided by
GFATM strengthened public–private collaboration through
allowing NGOs to establish umbrella organisations that
helped to channel funds through principal recipients to
sub-recipients [57]. There are still gaps, however, in the in-
volvement of the private sector, and perceptions about how
well GHIs are working with other stakeholders are contra-
dictory [19]. There is evidence that some of the NGOs and
CSOs do not have the capacity to implement GHI activities
or absorb their funds [55]. Also, some indigenous NGOs
have not been targeted nor reached with GHI funding,
meaning that a few NGOs and CSOs dominate and benefit
from GHI funding [15].
Discussion
GHI commitments have been timely in providing the sup-
port necessary to handle diseases affecting LMICs [2, 41].
It is indisputable that without their support, coverage and
access to disease-specific services such as those for HIV,
tuberculosis and malaria would not have been possible for
the LMICs [1, 41]. GHI support in LMICs has been varied
in nature, involving financial support, technical assistance
and HSS [17, 20, 24].
The positive outcomes of GHI support have been ac-
companied with negative effects that have generated
controversy about its value [18, 19, 45]. GHIs have been
criticised for their influence on national health priorities,
decreased domestic spending on health, misalignment
between their priorities and country health needs, distrac-
tion of government officials from their general respon-
sibilities for health, creation of parallel systems, internal
migration of health workers, increased burdening of
HRH, lowered quality of services owing to pressure to
meet targets, and weak accountability of the nongovern-
mental sector they fund [2, 20, 21, 24, 27, 56]. Despite be-
ing pro-poor, GHIs have not been able to directly address
equity through poverty-reduction strategies, which has
contributed to the growing inequalities in access to health
services [12, 15, 22].
The African Region is continually striving to improve
harmonisation and coordination of support from donors
and partners [58]. The initiatives focusing on this include
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the Accra
Agenda for Action, International Health Partnership and
HHA. All these have the common objective of ensuring
that there is effective investment in low and middle in-
come countries through financing of sustainable de-
velopment initiatives. Such an objective can only be
achieved by ensuring that aid goals are aligned with
countries’ needs and priorities. It also requires that the
countries have the upper hand in the decision and imple-
mentation of programmes, and that capacity is built and
systems are strengthened for GHIs to work without affect-
ing government functioning [59, 60].
Study limitations
Rapid reviews are generally criticised for not being
thorough in their searches. In order to mitigate this we
conducted a thorough search using several sources of
information including reference list so as not to miss
any relevant study. Inherent in all literature reviews is
the fact that, rigorous analysis is sometimes hampered
by the content of existing studies. This was one of the
main limitations of this study, since many of the recent
studies had a similar study focus as previous ones. Des-
pite this challenge, the review is an adequate reflection
of the state of governance, priorities, harmonisation
and alignment of GHIs in this setting.
Conclusion
This rapid review of literature, which includes studies
from GHIs’ early and recent times, reveals that little has
changed in their approaches. GHIs still operate in a ver-
tical manner, bypass countries’ systems, compete for the
limited human resources, influence countries’ policies and
favour unsustainable interventions [10, 13, 45]. The fol-
lowing recommendations will help to maximise the
benefits and reduce the unintended challenges posed by
the current GHI approaches:
 Future GHI support should be more comprehensive
and less selective. It should include aspects for
successful disease control such as provision of the
necessary drugs through funding, donation or
discounted pricing; funding for some operational
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costs; and technical assistance in line with identified
systems gaps.
 There should be emphasis on strengthening of the
wider systems that include social, community and
health systems. GTZ’s BACKUP Initiative, which
allocates specific funding for health systems support
which is not disease specific [38], could serve as an
example for this.
 GHIs should strive to improve country level
governance by using existing structures such as
SWAp or iHP+ mechanisms. This ideally should
extend to the use of joint planning schedules,
meetings and M&E systems in order to avoid
duplication of effort and overburdening of the
countries with parallel procedures.
 Modernisation is changing the disease profile in
Africa. Africa is facing an alarming level of non-
communicable diseases. GHI support should align
with such changes with time. Also GHIs should
evaluate their performance on epidemiologic
effectiveness.
 GHIs should play an important role in promoting
better governance in Africa through advocating for
and stimulating generation and application of
appropriate policies and approaches, and giving a
special focus to transparency, accountability and
performance.
 To improve the involvement of NGOs and CSOs,
GHIs should support and promote standardisation
of processes and accountability by CSOs at the
country level and foster the empowerment of
indigenous NGOs and CSOs.
Abbreviations
CSOs, civil society organisations; DALY, disability-adjusted life year; GFATM,
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; GHIs, global health
initiatives; GHP, global health partnership; HSS, health systems strengthening;
MAP, World Bank’s Multi-country HIV/AIDS Program; NAC, national AIDS council;
NGO, nongovernmental organisation; PEPFAR, US President’s Emergency Plan
for AIDS Relief; WHO, World Health Organization.
Acknowledgements
We owe profound gratitude to Jehovah Jireh for sustenance during the
entire process of writing this paper. The content of the article represent the
analysis, perceptions and views of the authors only and does not represent
the decisions or stated policies of the World Health Organization.
Declarations
This article has been published as part of BMC Health Services Research Volume
16 Supplement 4, 2016: Health policy dialogue: lessons from Africa. The full
contents of the supplement are available online at http://bmchealthservres.
biomedcentral.com/articles/supplements/volume-16-supplement-4.
Availability of data and materials
Not applicable.
Authors’ contributions
Both authors contributed to the review of literature and drafting of the
manuscript. AM led the drafting of the manuscript. All the authors read and
approved the final manuscript.
Competing interests
Authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Consent for publication
Not applicable
Ethics approval and consent to participate
This study involved only the review of published literature and documents in
the public domain and as such did not require ethical clearance.
Published: 18 July 2016
References
1. WHO. Maximizing positive synergies between health systems and global
health initiatives. Report on the Expert Consultation on Positive Synergies
between Health Systems and Global Health Initiatives. Geneva: WHO; 2008.
2. Cahill K, Flemming D, Conway M, Gupta S. Global health partnerships:
assessing country consequences. In: High level Forum: Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation, Seattle USA; 2003; 92–103.
3. Shaw RP, Wang H, Kress D, Hovig D. Donor and domestic financing of
primary health care in low income countries. Health Systems Reform.
2015;1(1):72–88.
4. Komatsu R, Korenromp EL, Low-Beer D, Watt C, Dye C, Steketee RW, Nahlen
BL, Lyerla R, Garcia-Calleja JM, Cutler J. Lives saved by Global Fund-
supported HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria programs: estimation
approach and results between 2003 and end-2007. BMC Infect Dis. 2010;
10(1):109.
5. WHO Regional Office for Africa. Atlas of Africa health statistics. WHO Regional
Office for Africa; Brazaville Congo. 2014.
6. WHO. Global Health Observatory (GHO) data. http://www.who.int/gho/
child_health/mortality/mortality/en/. Accessed 10 Nov 2015. Geneva; 2015
7. Dentico. [Ebola and the global governance of health]. Recenti Progressi in
Medicina. 2014;105(11):405–6.
8. Lancet T. Who runs global health? Lancet. 2009;373(9681):2083.
9. Chkhatarashvili K, Gotsadze G, Rukhadze N. Effects of GFATM on Georgia's
Health Ssystem Development. Tbilisi: Curatio International Foundation; 2008.
10. Harmonisation for Health in Africa. Mapping global health initiatives in the
WHO African Region. Brazzaville: WHO Regional Office for Africa; 2015.
11. Hanefeld J. The impact of global health initiatives at national and sub-national level
– a policy analysis of their role in implementation processes of antiretroviral
treatment (ART) roll-out in Zambia and South Africa. AIDS Care. 2010;22(S1):93–102.
12. Hanefeld J. How have global health initiatives impacted on health equity?
Promot Educ. 2008;15(1):19–23.
13. Group WHOMPSC. An assessment of interactions between global health
initiatives and country health systems. Lancet. 2009;373(9681):2137–69.
14. Grace C. Global Fund country case studies report. London: Department for
International Development; 2004.
15. Cohn J, Russell A, Baker B, Kayongo A, Wanjiku E, Davis P. Using global
health initiatives to strengthen health systems: a civil society perspective.
Global Public Health. 2011;6(7):687–702.
16. Donoghue M, Brugha R, Walt G, Pariyo G, Ssengooba F. Global Fund tracking
study – Uganda country report. Uganda: London School of Hygiene & Tropical
Medicine, UK, and Institute of Public Health, Makerere University; 2005.
17. Ashley W, Wyss K, Shakarishvili G, Atun R, Don de Savigny D. Global health
initiative investments and health systems strengthening: a content analysis
of global fund investments. Globalisation Health. 2013;9(1):30.
18. Biesma RG, Brugha R, Harmer A, Walsh A, Spicer N, Walt G. The effects of
global health initiatives on country health systems: a review of the evidence
from HIV/AIDS control. Health Policy Plan. 2009;24(4):239–52.
19. Bornemisza O, Bridge J, Olszak-Olszewski M, Sakvarelidze G, Lazarus J. Health
aid governance in fragile states: the Global Fund experience. Global Health
Gov 2010;4(1)1-18.
20. Bowser D, Sparkes SP, Mitchell A, Bossert TJ, Bӓrnighausen T, Gedik G, Atun
R. Global Fund investments in human resources for health: innovation and
missed opportunities for health systems strengthening. Health Policy Plan.
2014;29:986–97.
21. Brugha R, Donoghue M, Starling M, Ndubani P, Ssengooba F, Fernandes B, Walt
G. The Global Fund: managing great expectations. Lancet. 2004;364(9428):95–100.
22. Chima CC, Homedes N. Impact of global health governance on country
health systems: the case of HIV initiatives in Nigeria. J Global Health
2015;5(1):010407.
Mwisongo and Nabyonga-Orem BMC Health Services Research 2016, 16(Suppl 4):212 Page 253 of 366
23. Starling M, Brugha R, Fernandes B, Cliff J, Walt G. Global Fund Tracking study:
Mozambique country report. Global Fund; London, London School of Hygiene
and Tropical Medicine, 2005.
24. Atun R, Pothapregada SK, Kwansah J, Degbotse D, Lazarus JV. Critical
interactions between the Global Fund-supported HIV programs and the
health system in Ghana. J Acquir Immune Defic Syndr. 2011;57:S72–6.
25. Nervi L. Mapping a sample of global health partnerships: a recount of significant
findings. Paper prepared at request of HSS Area/PAHO. Wahington: PAHO; 2007.
26. Warren AE, Wyss K, Shakarishvili G, Atun R, de Savigny D. Global health
initiative investments and health systems strengthening: a content analysis
of global fund investments. Global Health. 2013;9(1):30.
27. Brugha R, Kadzandira J, Simbaya J, Dicker P, Mwapasa V, Walsh A. Health
workforce responses to global health initiatives funding: a comparison of
Malawi and Zambia. Hum Resour Health. 2010;8(1):19.
28. Carlson C. Mapping global health partnerships: What they are, what they do
and where they operate. DFID Health Resource Center; London, 2009.
29. Cruz VO, McPake B. Global health initiatives and aid effectiveness: insights
from a Ugandan case study. Global Health. 2011;7(1):20.
30. Drew R, Purvis G. Strengthening health systems to improve HIV/AIDS
programs in the Europe and Eurasia region using Global Fund resources.
Washington, DC: USAID; 2006.
31. Zuber PL, El-Ziq I, Kaddar M, Ottosen AE, Rosenbaum K, Shirey M, Kamara L
Duclos P. Sustaining GAVI-supported vaccine introductions in resource-poor
countries. Vaccine. 2011;29(17):3149–54.
32. Tricco AC, Antony J, Zarin W, Strifler L, Ghassemi M, Ivory J, Perrier L, Hutton
B, Moher D, Straus SE. A scoping review of rapid review methods. BMC
Med. 2015;13(1):1.
33. Khangura S, Konnyu K, Cushman R, Grimshaw J, Moher D. Evidence summaries:
the evolution of a rapid review approach. Syst Rev. 2012;1(1):1–9.
34. Buse K, Harmer AM. Seven habits of highly effective global public–private
health partnerships: practice and potential. Soc Sci Med. 2007;64(2):259–71.
35. Sridhar D, Tamashiro T. Vertical funds in the health sector: Lessons for
education from the Global Fund and GAVI. United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); Paris-France, 2009.
36. Lohman N. District health officer perceptions of PEPFAR’s influence on the
health system in Uganda, 2005–2011. University of Washington; USA, 2014.
37. Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Global health partnerships: Assessing
country consequences. Seattle: McKinsey & Company, Global Public Health
Practice; 2005.
38. Caines K, Buse K, Carlson C, de Loor R, Druce N, Grace C, Pearson M, Sancho J.
Assessing the impact of global health partnerships. DFID Health Resource
Centre, London; 2004.
39. McCoy D, Kinyua K. Allocating scarce resources strategically - an evaluation
and discussion of the Global Fund's pattern of disbursements. PLoS one;
2012;7(5):e 34749.
40. Oomman N, Bernstein M, Rosenzweig S. Following the funding for HIV/AIDS: A
comparative analysis of the funding practices of PEPFAR the Global Fund and
World Bank MAP in Mozambique, Uganda and Zambia; Center for Global
Health; Washington; 2007.
41. Caines K. Key Evidence from major studies of selected global health
partnerships, High Level Forum on the Health MDGs background paper.
London: Centre DHR, UK; 2005.
42. Storeng KT. The GAVI Alliance and the ‘Gates approach’ to health system
strengthening. Global Public Health. 2014;9(8):865–79.
43. Ravishankar N, Gubbins P, Cooley RJ, Leach-Kemon K, Michaud CM, Jamison
DT, Murray CJ. Financing of global health: tracking development assistance
for health from 1990 to 2007. Lancet. 2009;373(9681):2113–24.
44. Wilkinson D, Brugha R, Hewitt S, Trap B, Eriksen J, Nielsen L, Weber W.
Assessment of proposal development and review process of the Global
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria- Assessment Report. Euro
Health Group; 2006.
45. Banteyerga H, Kidanu A, Bennett S, Stillman K. The system-wide effects of
the Global Fund in Ethiopia. Baseline study report; Bethesda MD. Partners
for HealthReformPlus, Abt Associates Inc. 2005.
46. Starling M, Brugha R, Walt G. Global Fund Tracking Study: Tanzania country
report. Lond Sch Hyg Trop Med; 2005
47. Le Gargasson J-B, Breugelmans JG, Mibulumukini B, Da Silva A, Colombini A.
Sustainability of national immunization programme (NIP) performance
and financing following Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization
(GAVI) support to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Vaccine.
2013;31(15):1886–91.
48. Ferrinho P, Dramé M, Tumusiime P. Perceptions of the usefulness of
external support to immunization coverage in Chad: an analysis of the
GAVI-Alliance cash-based support. Pan Afr Med J 2013;15:44.
49. Stillman K, Bennett S. Systemwide effects of the Global Fund: interim
findings from three country studies. Bethesda MD. Partners for Health
ReformPlus (PHRplus), Abt Associates, Inc, accessed from http://pdf.usaid.
gov/pdf_docs/PNADF196.pdf. Accessed on the 15th April 2016 2005.
50. Bulled NL. Hesitance towards voluntary medical male circumcision in
Lesotho: Reconfiguring global health governance. Global Public Health.
2015;10:757–72.
51. Ainsworth M, Vaillancourt D, Gaubatz JH. Committing to results: improving the
effectiveness of HIV/AIDS assistance. An OED evaluation of the World Bank’s
assistance for HIV/AIDS control. World Bank Publications; Washington DC. 2005.
52. African Forum and Network on Debt and development (AFRODAD); A
crtitical asessment of AID management and donor harmonisation in Liberia:
a case study. African Forum and Network on Debt and Development.Harare
Zimbabwe; 2007.
53. Vujicic M, Weber SE, Nikolic IA, Atun R, Kumar R. GAVI: The Global Fund and
World Bank support for human resources for health in developing countries.
World Bank, Washington DC; 2011.
54. Mtonya B, Chizimbi S. Systemwide effects of the Global Fund in Malawi: final
report. The Partners for Health ReformPlus project. Inc, Bethesda MD. 2006.
55. Doyle C, Patel P. Civil society organisations and global health initiatives:
problems of legitimacy. Soc Sci Med. 2008;66(9):1928–38.
56. Cailhol J, Craveiro I, Madede T, Makoa E, Mathole T, Parsons AN, Van Leemput
L, Biesma R, Brugha R, Chilundo B. Analysis of human resources for health
strategies and policies in 5 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, in response to
GFATM and PEPFAR-funded HIV activities. Global Health. 2013;9(1):52.
57. Smith O, Gbangbade S, Hounsa A, Miller-Franco L. Benin: system-wide
effects of the Global Fund. Interim findings. 2005
58. Africa Union. Africa health strategy: 2007–2015. Third Session of the African
Union Conference of Ministers of Health; African Union, Addiss Ababa -
Ethiopia; 2007. 9–13.
59. Foresti M, Booth D, O’Neil T. Aid effectiveness and human rights: strengthening
the implementation of the Paris Declaration. Overseas Development Institute
report to the DAC; London, 2006.
60. Booth D. Aid effectiveness: bringing country ownership (and politics) back
in. Confl Secur Dev. 2012;12(5):537–58.
•  We accept pre-submission inquiries 
•  Our selector tool helps you to find the most relevant journal
•  We provide round the clock customer support 
•  Convenient online submission
•  Thorough peer review
•  Inclusion in PubMed and all major indexing services 
•  Maximum visibility for your research
Submit your manuscript at
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central 
and we will help you at every step:
Mwisongo and Nabyonga-Orem BMC Health Services Research 2016, 16(Suppl 4):212 Page 254 of 366
